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 The concept of interpersonal abilities refers to performance measures using social 
stimuli which quantify individual differences in social competences and skills that are at the 
core of interpersonal communication such as the abilities to perceive and remember faces and 
the abilities to recognize and express emotions. The aim of this dissertation was to examine 
the influence of interpersonal abilities on social decisions. A particular focus lay on the 
quantification of individual differences in brain-behavior relationships associated with 
processing interpersonally relevant stimuli. Study 1 added to existing evidence on brain-
behavior relationships, specifically between psychometric constructs of face cognition and 
event-related potentials (ERPs) associated with different stages of face processing (encoding, 
perception, and memory) in a familiarity decision. Our findings confirm a substantial 
relationship between the N170 latency and the early-repetition effect (ERE) amplitude with 
three established face cognition ability factors. The shorter the N170 latency and the more 
pronounced the ERE amplitude, the better is the performance in face perception and memory 
and the faster is the speed of face cognition. Study 2 found that the ability to recognize fearful 
faces as well as the general spontaneous expressiveness during social interaction are linked to 
prosocial choices in several socio-economic games. Sensitivity to the distress of others as well 
as spontaneous expressiveness seem to foster reciprocal interactions with prosocial others. 
Study 3 confirmed the model of strong reciprocity in that prosociality drives negative 
reciprocity in the ultimatum game. Using multilevel structural equation modeling (SEM) in 
order to estimate brain-behavior relationships of fairness preferences, we found strong 
reciprocators to show more pronounced relative feedback-negativity (FN) amplitude in 
response to the faces of bargaining partners. Thus, the results of this dissertation suggest that 
established individual differences in behavioral measures of interpersonal ability are partly 
due to individual differences in brain mechanisms. 
1 
 
Interpersonal abilities & social decisions 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Das Konzept der interpersonellen Fähigkeiten bezieht sich auf Leistungsaufgaben der 
sozialen Kognition, welche individuelle Unterschiede in der interpersonellen Kommunikation 
quantifizieren. Diese Aufgaben messen beispielsweise die Fähigkeiten Gesichter zu erkennen 
und sich diese zu merken sowie Emotionen zu erkennen und diese auszudrücken. Ziel dieser 
Dissertation war die Untersuchung des Einflusses von interpersonellen Fähigkeiten auf 
soziale Entscheidungen. Ein besonderer Fokus lag auf der Quantifizierung von individuellen 
Unterschieden in „brain-behavior“ Beziehungen im Rahmen interpersoneller Fähigkeiten. 
Studie 1 erweiterte bestehende Evidenz zu brain-behavior Beziehungen zwischen 
psychometrischen Konstrukten der Gesichterkognition und Ereigniskorrelierten Potentiale 
(EKPs), welche mit den verschiedenen Stadien der Gesichterverarbeitung (Enkodierung, 
Wahrnehmung, Gedächtnis) während einer Bekanntheitsentscheidung assoziiert sind. Unsere 
Ergebnisse bestätigen eine substantielle Beziehung zwischen der N170 Latenz und der 
Amplitude des frühen Wiederholungseffektes (ERE) mit drei Faktoren der 
Gesichterkognition. Je kürzer die N170 Latenz und je ausgeprägter die ERE Amplitude, umso 
genauer und schneller ist die Gesichterkognition. Studie 2 ergab, dass die Fähigkeit ängstliche 
Gesichter zu erkennen sowie die generelle spontane Expressivität während der sozialen 
Interaktion mit prosozialen Entscheidungen korreliert. Sensitivität für das Leid anderer sowie 
emotionale Expressivität scheinen reziproke Interaktionen mit Gleichgesinnten zu fördern. 
Studie 3 bestätigte das Modell der starken Reziprozität, da Prosozialität die negative 
Reziprozität im Ultimatum Spiel beeinflusste. Unter der Verwendung von mehrebenen 
Strukturgleichungsmodellen (SEM) entdeckten wir, dass Menschen mit ausgeprägter 
Reziprozität eine größere Amplitude der relativen „feedback-negativity“ (FN) auf das Gesicht 
von Spielpartnern zeigen. Insgesamt sprechen die Ergebnisse dafür, dass die etablierten 
individuellen Unterschiede in den Verhaltensmaßen der interpersonellen Fähigkeiten zum 









An aim of contemporary cognitive neuroscience is to translate behavioral evidence 
into neurological data in order to explain human behavior in terms of its biological 
underpinnings and to establish so called “brain-behavior relationships”. Cognitive, social, 
clinical, affective, developmental, and economic neurosciences have produced great progress 
in the understanding of brain structure and its influence on human cognition. This is not only 
yielding a new comprehension of human behavior but also offering a new perspective on the 
reduction problem which arises when simply relating classes of data with different properties 
to each other. The very common practice in cognitive neuroscience for establishing brain-
behavior relationships is the calculation of simple measures of association. This approach 
does not consider the question how to best model the relationship between mental states in 
terms of psychological attributes and neurological processes in terms of measured neural 
activity. However, in order to provide a better understanding of brain-behavior relationships a 
theoretical conception about the nature of this relationship is indispensable. 
Philosophical stances on this relationship – identity vs. supervenience theory – can be 
translated into psychometric models which provide an empirically testable and sound 
mathematical foundation for the reduction problem (Kievit, Romeijn, et al., 2011). In identity 
theory the psychological attributes are identical to and therefore grounded in their physical 
realization, whereas in supervenience theory the higher order psychological attributes are 
realized in their neurological properties – they supervene on them. Kievit, van Rooijen, et al. 
(2011) provide a proof of principle for the supervenience by modelling the brain-behavior 
relationships of general intelligence (g) using so called Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes 
models (MIMIC). Their analyses suggest that contributions from different brain mechanisms 
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to unidimensional g provide the best fit against the data, suggesting a heterogeneous set of 
physical properties that determine the psychological attribute of general intelligence. 
1.1 Aims and outline of the present work 
The aim of this dissertation was to apply the exemplified modelling of brain-behavior 
relationships to the level of social cognition, more specifically by investigating interpersonal 
abilities and their influence on social decisions. The concept of interpersonal abilities refers to 
performance measures of social cognition which quantify individual differences in social 
competencies that are at the core of interpersonal communication. To exemplify, such 
competencies – characterized as individual differences variables that lie between stable, 
genetically determined dispositions and easily acquired skills – are for instance the abilities to 
perceive and remember faces (face cognition) and the abilities to recognize and express 
emotions. Section 1.2 will provide a more detailed explanation of the concept of interpersonal 
abilities. 
The structure of interpersonal abilities has been investigated in a similar vein as the 
structure of human intelligence in terms of components of cognitive architecture(Carroll, 
1993; Kyllonen, 2002). For instance, Wilhelm et al. (2010) established face cognition as a 
specific social ability that is clearly distinct from general cognitive ability and object 
cognition. They identified three component abilities of face cognition – accuracy of face 
perception, accuracy of face memory, and the speed of face cognition – which showed 
specific associations with neural indicators of face cognition as measured in event-related-
potentials (ERPs) in EEG (Herzmann, Kunina, Sommer, & Wilhelm, 2010).  
Study 1 included in this dissertation is a replication and extension of the investigation 
of brain-behavior relationships in the domain of face cognition. This study helped me to get 
acquainted with the statistical tools, such as latent difference score modelling (LDS), to 





acquired in an independent session. The focus of study 2 was the decoding of emotion 
expressions from faces and their association with social decisions in terms of prosocial 
behavior. The analyses have been guided by the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson et al., 
1991). In this study, I examined the relation of perceptual as well as of expressive emotional 
abilities to altruism in terms of prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior was measured with a 
series of socio-economic games involving a trade-off between self- and other-regarding 
interests (see section 1.3). The experience I gained by conducting this study and the 
multivariate modelling of socio-economic choices prepared me for study 3 in which I 
investigated brain-behavior relationships of fairness preferences in the ultimatum game in 
terms of individual differences in reciprocity.  
A common denominator of the three studies is the establishment of links between 
interpersonally relevant traits and individual differences in measures of physiological activity. 
Following the person-situation debate between 1970 and 1990 (Mischel, 1990) the 
biopsychological personality research distinguishes two perspectives onto the interaction of 
personality trait and situational influences in determining individual differences in behavior 
and physiological processes. A personistic perspective on trait-physiology assumes habitual, 
transsituationally stable individual differences in physiological responses, whereas an 
interactionistic conceptualization supposes that traits as dispositions are only active in certain 
situational contexts. Evidence favors the interactionistic account in that situational context 
and its subjective representation by the participants moderate the trait–physiology 
relationships for both peripheral and central nervous system activity (Stemmler & Wacker, 
2010). Hence, the study design should allow measuring both, stable individual differences in 
interpersonal ability tasks, as well as situationally-bound physiological reactions evoked by a 
specific manipulation of the situational context. In most analyses of the presented studies we 
did not quantify individual differences in ERPs per se, but individual difference in relative 
ERP parameters, measured as difference waves between experimental conditions. In study 1 
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we were for example interested in the neurophysiological correlates of face memory. We 
hypothesized that the early and late repetition effects (ERE and LRE) reflecting the re-
activation of both stored facial structures (ERE) and person-identity information (LRE) 
should account for variance in a latent variable representing face memory ability. In order to 
evoke ERE and LRE, a specific experimental manipulation is required, namely the 
comparison of ERPs in response to primed and unprimed face stimuli. This exemplifies how 
the priming manipulation reflects a changing situational variable which allows us to quantify 
the neurophysiological correlates of face memory, namely the ERE and LRE, that are 
parameterized by calculating the difference amplitude waves between primed and unprimed 
face processing. Similarly, in study 3 we contrasted the ERPs elicited by faces of unfair 
compared to fair bargaining partners and used this difference wave, the feedback-negativity 
(FN) as a neural indicator of fairness preferences. Section 1.4 will focus on the applied 
statistical tools to use difference waves such as ERE or FN in the modelling of brain-behavior 
relationships. 
1.2 Interpersonal abilities 
The face is a mirror reflecting crucial information about the person we are interacting 
with. Not only does it reveal age, gender, ethnicity and attractiveness but it also serves as a 
medium to transmit social signals, like emotions. Functional and neuroanatomical models of 
face cognition (Bruce & Young, 1986; Calder & Young, 2005; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 
2002) assume two relatively independent processing streams for the recognition of identity 
and the recognition of facial expressions such as manifestations of emotions. Recognizing the 
identity of a face consists of perception, encoding and re-activation of invariant facial features 
in the lateral fusiform gyrus (Gobbini & Haxby, 2007; Haxby et al., 2002). Recognizing 
emotion from facial expressions requires a distributed neural system that consists of multiple, 





which construct detailed representations from the configuration of facial features (core 
system). Subsequent recognition of emotion draws on a set of brain structures, including 
amygdala, anterior insula and orbitofrontal cortex, which relates perceptual representations of 
the face to the generation of knowledge about emotion and social cues (extended system) 
(Adolphs, 2002a, 2002b; Haxby et al., 2002). The processing stages postulated in 
neurocognitive models of person recognition suggests that a separation between perceptual 
and mnemonic processes should be applied when studying individual differences in 
behavioral interpersonal ability tasks of face (Wilhelm et al., 2010) and emotion recognition 
(Hildebrandt, Sommer, Schacht, & Wilhelm, 2015).   
Emotion recognition accuracy (ERA) from faces has been conceptualized as a 
performance measure of emotional intelligence, next to higher order ability branches, such as 
assessing, understanding, and managing one’s own and also other people’s emotions (Mayer, 
Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001). ERA is associated with, but separable from, general 
cognitive ability factors (e.g. Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008) and is related to better social 
adjustment and mental health (Carton, Kessler, & Pape, 1999; Izard et al., 2001; Montagne et 
al., 2005; Nowicki & Duke, 1994). Previous research points to a link between ERA and 
prosocial behavior. Hence, on the one hand, ERA promotes the effectiveness of economic 
negotiations, both in terms of creating value (joint outcome) and a greater share for oneself 
(Elfenbein, Foo, White, Tan, & Aik, 2007). On the other hand, ERA is negatively correlated 
with self-interested manipulative behaviors such as Machiavellianism (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 
2012).  
Guided by the empathy-altruism hypothesis, that states prosocial motivation evoked 
by empathy to be directed toward increasing the welfare of a person in need (Batson et al., 
1991; Batson & Moran, 1999), in study 2 we hypothesized that ERA will be associated with 
prosocial behavior in socio-economic games. Empathy is a broad concept, disputed both in its 
nature and prevalence across species and age groups. The Perception-Action-Model (PAM) 
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provides a useful theoretical account for empirical findings about different levels of empathy, 
such as emotional contagion, sympathy, empathy, cognitive empathy, or prosocial behavior. 
According to PAM, empathy requires the perception of emotional facial expressions (Preston 
& de Waal, 2002). Indeed, highly empathic persons show stronger facial reactions to facial 
expressions of others and this tendency is accompanied by higher empathic accuracy 
(Dimberg, Andréasson, & Thunberg, 2011). Using structural equation modelling, Kunecke, 
Hildebrandt, Recio, Sommer, and Wilhelm (2014) reported a substantial relationship between 
emotion-related facial reactions, measured with the electromyogram, to dynamic emotional 
facial expressions and emotion perception ability, providing evidence for the role of facial 
muscle activation in emotion perception from an individual differences perspective. 
Therefore, the ability to recognize emotions in others but also the tendency to express 
emotions oneself seem to be core components of empathy and may influence decisions on 
social cooperation.  
In study 2 we considered an ability perspective onto empathy as promising since most 
research on the relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior has induced empathic 
states (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999; Leiberg, Klimecki, & Singer, 2011; 
Rumble, Van Lange, & Parks, 2010), or relied on self-reports of trait empathy (Edele, 
Dziobek, & Keller, 2013; Pavey, Greitemeyer, & Sparks, 2012). Both approaches may be 
compromised by effects of social desirability (Lucas & Baird, 2006). This assumption is 
supported by the comprehensive literature on distortions of self-reported personality traits 
(see Ziegler, MacCann, & Roberts, 2011) and of measures of trait emotional intelligence (e.g. 
Kluemper, 2008), including empathy (e.g. Kämpfe, Penzhorn, Schikora, Dünzl, & 
Schneidenbach, 2009). The perspective on empathy as being an ability that can be measured 
by capturing performance is more robust against social bias, but it attracted less research 





Interestingly, apart from emotion recognition also emotion expression may be 
associated with prosocial behavior. Inspired by the assumption in evolution theory that 
cooperation among non-kin may evolve in a population through the identification of honest 
and non-falsifiable signals (Dawkins, 1976; Hamilton, 1964), it is argued that nonverbal 
signals such as spontaneous or voluntary emotional expressivity can act as a marker for 
cooperative behavior or trustworthiness (DeSteno et al., 2012; Frank, 1988; Scharlemann, 
Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001). Expressivity may help to identify cooperative individuals 
since cooperators display more positive emotions such as Duchenne (spontaneous) smiles 
compared to non-cooperators (Brown, Palameta, & Moore, 2003; Mehu, Grammer, & 
Dunbar, 2007). Schug, Matsumoto, Horita, Yamagishi, and Bonnet (2010) examined the 
spontaneous expression of emotions in game partners when faced with unfair behavior. 
Cooperators, defined by their propositions in the ultimatum game, displayed greater amounts 
of positive as well as negative spontaneous emotional expressions when responding to unfair 
offers, suggesting that cooperators may be generally more expressive than non-cooperators. 
The authors speculate that general emotional expressivity might be a more dependable signal 
of cooperative tendency than the display of positive emotion alone. In line with the 
interactionist account of biopsychological personality research (Stemmler & Wacker, 2010) 
that conceptualizes traits as dispositions that are only active in certain situational contexts we 
assessed the trait of emotional expressivity in a well-defined and experimentally manipulated 
interval of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (see section 1.3). This interval was the time window in 
which the participant received feedback about the co-player’s decision to cooperate or defect. 
This allowed us to study spontaneous emotional expressions in a situational context, where 
participants were exposed to meaningful stimuli and therefore motivated to show specific 
emotional reactions when learning about whether their co-player decided to cooperate or 
defect. We tried to construct an ecologically valid and reciprocal interaction situation by 
9 
 
Interpersonal abilities & social decisions 
 
displaying each co-player’s face on screen and informing the participants that their co-players 
would also see their own picture. 
1.3 Socio-economic games 
Socio-economic games are social decision-making tasks simulating real-world 
strategic interactions (Camerer, 2003). The games that have been used in this dissertation 
involve two individuals within one decision-making period who make monetary choices 
based on an interdependent pay-off matrix. The two bargaining partners are given a set of 
rules and they face limited information since they are confronted with uncertainty about the 
other’s intentions. Importantly, the individuals’ choices alter not only their own outcome, but 
also the outcome of the other, allowing the researcher to study prosocial behavior, defined as 
tendency to enhance both joint outcomes and equality in outcomes (Van Lange, 1999). In its 
original mathematical formulation game theory hold the normative assumption of economic 
rationality (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), which claims that individuals maximize 
their personal gain. However, later experiments in behavioral economics (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) exposed that 
human behavior deviates from conventional economic assumptions of self-interest and 
rationality (homo oeconomicus), in that many people have a tendency to intentionally 
cooperate.  
One of the most extensively studied socio-economic games to measure cooperation 
behavior is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Here participants can cooperate or defect with a 
second player, such that individual earnings are maximized by defection but collective 
earnings are maximized by cooperation. According to Nash (1950) the rational choice is to 
defect since this maximizes individual earnings (Nash equilibrium). Nevertheless, in one-shot 
PD games, where partners are encountered only once, people tend to cooperate with a rate of 





cooperative behavior in PD assume stable individual differences (Brosig, 2002). For example, 
Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) observed that some participants always prefer to cooperate 
with their partners while others either defect or use a mixed strategy such as tit-for-tat. In an 
iterated PD tit-for-tat means that one player will first cooperate and then subsequently 
replicate an opponent's previous action. This is one form of reciprocity describing the reward 
of kind actions (positive reciprocity) and the punishment of unkind actions (negative 
reciprocity) (A. Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Simon, 2000). 
Negative reciprocity can be measured in the ultimatum game (UG), which is a two-
stage game where two individuals, a proposer and a responder, bargain over a fixed amount of 
money. First, the proposer offers a split of his endowment, and subsequently, the responder 
decides to accept or reject the offer. If accepted, each bargainer receives money according to 
the offer; if rejected, each bargainer receives nothing. According to economic rationality the 
responder should accept any offer to maximize personal gain. However, responders tend to 
show negative reciprocity by rejecting very unfair offers (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 
1982). Previous research suggests that there are individual differences in negative reciprocity 
since only 50% of the responders reject unfair offers in which they receive less than 30% of 
the total sum (Camerer, 2003).  
Since research has revealed substantial individual differences in social preferences in 
socio-economic games, the aim of the dissertation (study 2 and 3) was to shed some light on 
the psychophysiological factors that may determine individual differences in social decisions, 
such as cooperation. As already pointed out in section 1.2, empathy theories suggest that 
interpersonal abilities such as emotion recognition and emotion expression foster cooperation 
(study 2). A second research question that we were interested in concerned the role of 
personality in fairness preferences such as negative reciprocity (study 3), since previous 
research theorizes that interpersonal traits are at the source of the behavioral heterogeneity in 
socio-economic games (for a comprehensive review seeZhao & Smillie, 2015). 
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1.4 Methods to establish brain-behavior relationships 
  ERPs are not only a useful method to understand and evaluate cognitive, affective, 
motor and sensory processes within one individual, but they can also provide biomarkers for 
individual differences in interpersonal traits. For instance, Smillie, Cooper, and Pickering 
(2010) examined the influence of extraversion, a trait hypothesized to be originated from 
individual differences in the dopamine system, and a dopamine-related gene polymorphism, 
on FN during an associative reward-learning paradigm. Unpredicted non-reward evoked the 
most negative FN while unpredicted reward led to the least-negative FN. A difference wave 
comparing these conditions was significantly more pronounced for extraverts than for 
introverts. While the gene polymorphism did not significantly modulate the FN, it was 
significantly associated with extraversion. The calculation of difference waves between the 
ERPs elicited by two contrasted experimental conditions is a common tool in cognitive 
neuroscience (Luck, 2005). The difference wave reveals the time course and scalp distribution 
of the underlying component, arising from synchronized synaptic activity in populations of 
cortical neurons (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000), that differs across conditions.  
  Study 1 and 3 of this dissertation used such difference waves as biomarkers for 
individual differences in interpersonal traits. In contrast to Smillie et al. (2010), we did not 
analyze group differences (i.e. extraverts vs. introverts) in average difference waves, but were 
interested in studying the continuous relationship between neural indicators and interpersonal 
abilities (study 1) or traits (study 3). We therefore used structural equation modeling (SEMs) 
to estimate the relationships between latent factors consisting of multiple continuous 
indicators of ERP parameters and interpersonal ability/trait scores.  
Latent factors represent the common variance of multiple indicators on a 
measurement-error-free level (Bollen, 1989). Indicators that assess the same latent factor 
should correlate more highly with one another than with indicators that assess different latent 





unreliable (McArdle & Nesselroade, 1994; Nesselroade, Stigler, & Baltes, 1980) and 
therefore often prevent the convergence of a latent factor of difference scores. Here, the latent 
difference score technique (LDS; McArdle, 1988) has been particularly valuable in modeling 
small amplitude differences between two experimental conditions. LDS therefore allows for 
circumventing the reliability concerns often associated with any kind of difference scores. 
LDS parameterizes the difference between two ERPs on a latent level by controlling for 
measurement error. Such differences between ERPs are implicit in components like ERE and 
LRE, which are defined as the amplitude deviation between the processing of primed and 
unprimed faces. Similarly, the FN is defined as the amplitude difference between a bad and a 
good outcome in a bargaining context.  
For simplicity, the LDS is here described with the example of ERE as it was applied in 
study 1. We considered the priming conditions as the targeted experimental condition (see 
section 2.1). We assumed that the latent variable representing individual differences in 
priming effects could be explained by the baseline condition (unprimed) and the difference 
between the baseline and the targeted condition. The regression of the primed condition onto 
the unprimed condition and the regression of the primed condition onto the difference value 
(ERE) are modeled as a “perfect regression” (fixed to 1), since the primed condition is 
assumed to be completely determined by the baseline value and the difference between 
baseline and the experimental condition. This variance decomposition allowed for modeling 
the latent difference between primed and unprimed conditions, and therefore provided a 
measure of the ERE on a latent level. The latent difference variable represented individual 
differences in the neural signal of re-activating stored facial features that could be set in 
relation to face cognition ability scores.
13 
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2 Summary of the present studies 
2.1 “Neurocognitive mechanisms of individual differences in face cognition: A 
replication and extension” (study 1, Kaltwasser et al., 2014) 
Bruce and Young (1986) proposed a functional model to describe the serial 
recognition process of familiar faces. The output of an initial structural encoding (step 1) is 
matched with previously stored structural codes (face recognition units – step 2) before 
identity-specific semantic codes are accessed from person identity nodes (step 3), and finally 
names are retrieved. Previous work confirmed the involvement of specific ERPs in each 
processing step of this functional model. As a first step for instance the N170, characterized 
by a negative peak at occipito-temporal sites around 150-190 ms, which is larger for faces 
than for other objects, is considered to reflect configural encoding of facial features and their 
integration into a holistic percept (Eimer, 2011). In step 2, the ERE is associated with the 
activation of structural representations of faces in long-term memory and with the 
identification of familiar faces (Schweinberger & Burton, 2011). Being operationalized as the 
difference wave between ERPs to primed and unprimed faces in priming tasks and most 
pronounced at temporo-parietal sites around 260-330 ms, the ERE is larger for familiar as 
compared to unfamiliar faces (Schweinberger, Pfütze, & Sommer, 1995; Schweinberger, 
Pickering, Jentzsch, Burton, & Kaufmann, 2002). The psychometric work on individual 
differences in face cognition (Hildebrandt, Sommer, Herzmann, & Wilhelm, 2010; 
Hildebrandt, Wilhelm, Schmiedek, Herzmann, & Sommer, 2011; Wilhelm et al., 2010) is in 
line with the model of Bruce and Young (1986) in that there is a clear separation between 
processes of face perception and face memory. The follow-up study on brain-behavior 
relationships of face cognition (Herzmann et al., 2010) measured ERP components in a face 





using the same psychometric task battery of face cognition abilities. A limitation of this study 
by Herzmann and her colleagues (2010) was that individual differences in the accuracy of 
face perception and face memory were empirically undifferentiated. This might have been the 
case because the behavioral testing had been completed after the ERP experiment, leading to a 
dedifferentiation of these abilities due to training. The main aim of study 1 of this dissertation 
was to perform a replication of Herzmann et al. (2010) with a reversed experimental sequence 
of behavioral testing and physiological recording, in order to capture distinguishable face 
perception and face memory accuracy factors. We assessed the robustness of the findings with 
a slightly modified experimental task and a larger sample size. In order to replicate and extend 
these findings, we tested 110 participants on a comprehensive task battery measuring face 
cognition and general cognitive abilities, as represented in the structure of intelligence, 
followed by ERP recordings in a face learning and recognition task. This recognition task 
consisted of a familiarity decision on target faces that were previously learned, along with a 
set of faces that were unfamiliar to the participant. The target faces were either primed by the 
presentation of the same face identity 1800 ms before target onset (“primed”) or by the 
presentation of an unfamiliar face (“unprimed”).  
We replicated the link between ERP components indicating the speed of structural 
face encoding (N170 latency) and access to structural representations in memory (ERE) to the 
accuracy and speed of face cognition and to established cognitive abilities. Importantly, we 
extended the findings of Herzmann et al. (2010) in showing that not only face cognition 
accuracy per se is predicted by those ERPs, but that this relationship persists if we distinguish 
between face perception and face memory. The shorter the N170 latency, that is, the faster a 
person creates structural representations of faces, the better is her or his performance in face 
perception and memory and the faster is the speed of face cognition. Since the functional 
significance of the N170 may encompass not only structural encoding, but further configural 
and holistic encoding (Deffke et al., 2007; Eimer, 2011), it is plausible that interpersonal 
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variations in face cognition abilities are related with these basic processes. Hence, fast 
configural and holistic processing of faces seems to be a foundation for accurately learning 
and recognizing faces. 
Furthermore, individuals with more pronounced ERE amplitudes for familiar faces 
were faster and more accurate in face perception and memory, which in turn, has been 
associated with a more efficient activation of representations of faces, presumably localized in 
fusiform face-responsive regions (Eger, Schweinberger, Dolan, & Henson, 2005; 
Schweinberger et al., 2002). A novelty of the present study was the use of an unfamiliar face 
mask after each prime. The mask was introduced by Doerr, Herzmann, and Sommer (2011) 
with the purpose of eliminating contributions of perceptual codes to face priming. Since the 
brain-behavior relationships for the ERE remained largely unaltered by using a mask, we can 
conclude that the contribution of the access to structural face codes of known people in 
memory to individual differences in face cognition is not significantly confounded with 
priming effects of perceptual codes in vision.  
We extended findings of Herzmann et al. (2010) by using nested structural equation 
models with established cognitive abilities such as working memory, reasoning, immediate 
and delayed memory, mental speed and object recognition speed. This technique enabled us 
to control for face perception-related variance in face memory tasks by nesting face memory 
under face perception. This allowed us to test the distinction between face perception and face 
memory observed at the performance level, also at the neurocognitive level. We predicted that 
face perception and face memory can be separated statistically in the measurement model of 
face cognition abilities, and that they also show differential relationships with ERPs. Indeed 
the results suggest that the N170 latency reflects a face-specific perceptual-speed factor, 
whereas the ERE seems to be a non-face-specific, general speed indicator. Our results further 
indicate that the P100 amplitude is involved in face-specific memory related processes. This 





explained with a mechanism of selective attention as a study by Rutman, Clapp, Chadick, and 
Gazzaley (2010) suggests: To investigate the influence of selective attention on working 
memory (WM) recognition, they studied the temporal dynamics of top-down modulation in a 
selective, delayed-recognition paradigm. Participants saw overlapped, “double-exposed” 
images of faces and natural scenes. They were instructed to either memorize the face or the 
scene while simultaneously ignoring the other stimulus. Rutman et al. (2010) could show that 
the degree to which participants modulate the early P100 during selective stimulus encoding 
significantly correlated with their subsequent WM recognition. 
In conclusion, study 1 replicated and extended several previously established brain-
behavior relationships (Herzmann et al., 2010) between psychometric constructs of face 
cognition and ERP components associated with different stages of face processing (encoding, 
perception, and memory). Applying multivariate behavior measures and a modified repetition 
priming paradigm in independent sessions with new stimulus material we were able to 
distinguish between the accuracy of face perception and face memory as well the speed of 
face cognition in the measurement model, which had not been possible in the previous study. 
Our findings revealed a substantial relationship between the N170 latency and the ERE 
amplitude with all three face cognition abilities, indicating that persons with faster structural 
encoding of faces are also quicker to activate brain regions necessary to encode faces 
configurally and holistically such as lateral fusiform gyrus (Gobbini & Haxby, 2007; Haxby 
et al., 2002). 
2.2 “On the relationship of emotional abilities and prosocial behavior” (study 2, 
Kaltwasser et al., submitted) 
By assessing individual differences in ERA and spontaneous emotion expressions 
during social interaction, study 2 examined how the different subcomponents of empathy 
according to PAM (see section 1.2) are related to prosocial behavior in socio-economic 
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games. Our main question was whether there is an overall domain-general relationship 
between emotional abilities and prosocial behavior, or whether there are differential 
relationships for specific emotion categories. The conception of innate and instantly 
recognizable specific emotions, initially formulated by (Darwin, 2002/1872), was supported 
by Ekman and Friesen (1971) who described six primary emotions: Anger, disgust, happiness, 
fear, sadness and surprise. These primary emotions were found to be consistent in their 
expression across cultures and in other primates. Basic emotion theories imply that different 
emotions serve specialized interpersonal functions and consider emotions as coordinated 
systems of response shaped by natural selection because they increase fitness in specific 
situations (Nesse, 1990). The use of specific social signals may be explained in terms of 
adaptive functions advanced through evolution. For instance, social species, like primates, use 
nonverbal expressions of subordination or fear to avoid becoming targets of aggression by 
dominant conspecifics (Preuschoft, 1999).  
In humans, the ability to recognize emotion expressions of distress such as fear and 
sadness seems to be linked to prosocial behavior (Marsh & Ambady, 2007; Marsh & Blair, 
2008; Marsh, Kozak, & Ambady, 2007). Participants who more accurately recognized fear in 
a standard facial expression recognition task, also donated more to victims in a classic 
altruistic paradigm, acted more favorably in an alleged attractiveness rating task of other 
participants or reported more sympathy and desire to help. Furthermore, a meta-analysis by 
Marsh and Blair (2008) confirmed a link between antisocial behavior and specific deficits in 
recognizing fearful and sad expressions. The relationship between prosocial behavior and fear 
recognition can be explained by a concern mechanism (Nichols, 2001) or violence inhibition 
theory (Blair, 1995); according to these theories the correct interpretation of another’s distress 
cues induces empathic processes that increase the likelihood of prosocial behavior and 
decrease the likelihood of antisocial behavior. As described in section 1.2, study 2 





emotional expressivity can act as a marker of cooperative behavior (Frank, 1988; 
Scharlemann et al., 2001). 
In order to test the relationship of receptive and spontaneous expressive emotional 
abilities with prosocial behavior we applied a multivariate approach with a focus on 
individual differences. Participants played three socio-economic games widely used in 
behavioral economics and undertook three standardized tests of ERA for six emotion 
expressions: Anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. We also recorded 
spontaneous emotion expressions in response to feedback about the co-player’s cooperation 
or defection in PD. Furthermore, participants completed a questionnaire of social value 
orientation (SVO; Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011). The concept SVO extends the 
rational self-interest postulated in economic theory by assuming that individuals also tend to 
pursue broader goals such as equality in outcomes. The magnitude of concern people have for 
others can be measured by a 6-item questionnaire about how participants would share 
resources with an anonymous stranger (Murphy et al., 2011).  
By using several independent indicators, we modeled the relationship between the 
constructs of ERA and prosocial behavior at the level of latent factors – abstracting from 
measurement error and task specificity. Importantly, we tested the association of each basic 
emotion recognition performance to prosocial behavior, which allowed us to determine 
differential social signaling functions of different emotion categories. In contrast to most of 
the research regarding the influence of empathy or ERA on prosocial orientation, we 
measured prosociality in terms of cooperative choices, alas actual behavior. We consider it 
important to know whether the expected association between emotional ability and 
prosociality generalizes beyond lab procedures of helping behavior (e.g., donation) to 
standard measures of social preferences. 
We expected overall ERA to predict prosocial behavior. Regarding the signaling 
function of specific emotion categories, we hypothesized prosocial behavior to be most 
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strongly associated with the ability to recognize distress-related emotions such as fear. 
Furthermore, we predicted that cooperators display more spontaneous expressions than non-
cooperators during feedback about the co-player’s response. 
While there was no meaningful overall relationship of ERA with cooperative behavior 
in the socio-economic games, emotion specific analyses revealed that particularly the ability 
to recognize fearful and sad faces was associated with prosocial behavior and social value 
orientation. Also, the tendencies towards showing more smiles after learning about 
cooperation as well as showing more anger, less surprise, and fewer neutral expressions after 
learning about defection during the PD were linked to prosocial behavior. This is in line with 
a face-to-face study with a one-shot PD investigating whether cooperative individuals can 
credibly signal their intentions and whether this can be recognized by interaction partners 
(Brosig, 2002). Results revealed that both abilities, signaling and recognizing, are related to 
the individual’s tendency to cooperate.  
Our findings of an emotion-specific link between ERA and prosocial behavior as 
measured with standard socio-economic games, as well as with SVO, replicate previous 
research showing that the ability of recognizing fearful faces is related to prosocial behavior 
(Marsh & Ambady, 2007; Marsh & Blair, 2008; Marsh et al., 2007). This is in line with 
theories postulating a concern mechanism (Nichols, 2001), as well as with the empathy-
altruism hypothesis (Batson et al., 1991). Both theories assume that the sensitivity to the 
emotional state of a person in distress or need triggers the motivation to help. 
Regarding emotion expression our results support studies using human coders of 
emotion expression that found cooperative and altruistic individuals to display higher levels 
of positive emotion than non-cooperators (Brown et al., 2003; Mehu et al., 2007), and to be 
generally more expressive when faced with uncooperative behavior (Schug et al., 2010). 
Emotion theories suggest that anger signals aggressiveness and rejection (Frijda, Kuipers, & 





affiliation (Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 2000; Knutson, 1996). Moreover, an expectation of 
competition instead of cooperation promotes the expression of anger (Lanzetta & Englis, 
1989). It is therefore conceivable that prosocial individuals are motivated to express more 
anger in response to defection in order to support cooperative behavior: The tendency to 
express more negative emotion when confronted with defection but more positive emotion 
when faced with cooperation provides prosocial individuals with opportunities to choose 
other cooperative individuals as interaction partners. In all, cooperative individuals seem to be 
more sensitive to the distress of others and more expressive, possibly fostering reciprocal 
interactions with like-minded others. 
2.3 “Behavioral and neuronal determinants of negative reciprocity in the ultimatum 
game” (study 3, Kaltwasser et al., submitted) 
 While study 2 dealt with individual difference in active cooperation behavior in terms 
of prosocial choices, study 3 investigated why persons differ in reactive cooperation in terms 
of their responder behavior in the UG (see section 1.3). A responder shows negative 
reciprocity by rejecting unfair offers. The model of strong reciprocity claims that negative 
reciprocity reflects prosociality since the rejecting individual is sacrificing resources in order 
to punish unfair behavior (Fehr et al., 2002). However, Yamagishi et al. (2012) provided 
evidence against the strong reciprocity account since they did not find any correlation 
between negative reciprocity and prosocial behavior in other games. Instead, they found the 
rejection rate of unfair offers to be linked to the personality trait of assertiveness. They 
proposed that assertive participants use a tacit strategy to avoid the imposition of an inferior 
status. Clearly, people differ in negative reciprocity – but which motivation drives this 
variance in behavior? 
Osinsky, Mussel, Ohrlein, and Hewig (2014) studied neuronal processes of social 
evaluation by recording the EEG while participants played the UG. The participants 
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repeatedly received fair or unfair monetary offers from alleged other participants shown as 
portraits with neutral facial expressions. The faces could be used as predictive cues for the 
fairness of offers since some proposers would always make fair offers while others would 
only make unfair offers. Osinsky et al. (2014) measured the FN in response to the portraits of 
the different proposers and to their offers. The FN is an event-related-potential (ERP) 
characterized by a frontocentral negativity 300-500 ms after an unfavorable relatively to a 
favorable event (Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997). It has been explained as an indicator of 
‘good-vs-bad evaluation’ (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons, 2006), stemming from the 
dopaminergic signaling of reward prediction errors forwarded to medial frontal cortex 
(Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Interestingly, in the study by 
Osinsky et al. (2014) not only unfair relative to fair offers triggered a FN as in previous 
studies using the UG (Boksem & De Cremer, 2009; Hewig et al., 2011; Van der Veen & 
Sahibdin, 2011; Wu, Zhou, van Dijk, Leliveld, & Zhou, 2011), but also – over the course of 
the experiment – the faces of unfair compared to fair bargaining partners. This result 
corroborates previous research with fMRI where an affective value was associated with an 
opponent in repetitive interpersonal bargaining, based on her/his fairness in the preceding 
interaction history (Singer, Kiebel, Winston, Dolan, & Frith, 2004; Singer et al., 2006). Thus, 
Osinsky et al. (2014) discovered a basic neural mechanism of social evaluation during the 
UG, which was sensitive not only to the valence of monetary offers but also to learned 
fairness features of the proposers. This latter mechanism of social evaluation might also be 
indicative for individual differences in fairness preferences of the responders, that is, the 
evaluation of the proposers fairness may depend on the fairness preferences of the responder. 
In study 3, we aimed to investigate individual differences and neuronal correlates of 
negative reciprocity in the UG. Specifically, we were interested in understanding the 
motivation which promotes the rejection of unfair offers. We modelled brain-behavior 





measures of personality and fairness preferences. We used the same measure of prosocial 
behavior (SVO; Murphy et al., 2011) and a similar measure of assertiveness that were applied 
in Yamagishi et al. (2012). We hypothesized that both, prosociality and assertiveness are 
linked to the rejection of unfair offers in UG. Following up on the work by Osinsky et al. 
(2014), we expected the FN to indicate the fairness of both offers and proposers (faces). 
Moreover, we expected that negative reciprocity should drive the effects of individual 
differences in FN in response to the fairness of the proposer. Our rationale was that 
participants with stronger fairness concerns in terms of negative reciprocity should show more 
pronounced fairness effects in FN in response to the proposer’s face. 
Using SEM with a sufficiently large sample of N = 200, we found that both 
prosociality as well as assertiveness significantly predicted negative reciprocity measured by 
the rejection rate of unfair offers in UG. Furthermore, the results confirmed the FN as an 
indicator of social evaluation, since the faces of unfair and fair proposers elicited a 
significantly more negative amplitude 220-352 ms after face onset characterized by a 
frontocentral negativity. A second step of analysis linked the experimental within-subject 
effects of fairness of the proposer in FN amplitude to the measurement model of individual 
differences in negative reciprocity. Here we used multilevel SEM (mSEM) to investigate 
brain-behavior relationships of fairness preferences. The results revealed that the FN 
amplitude evoked by unfair and fair proposers relative to neutral ones was most pronounced 
in participants exhibiting stronger negative reciprocity in terms of rejection rates of unfair 
offers in UG. The mSEM did not provide evidence that assertiveness or prosociality 
significantly predicts relative FN amplitude. 
Our results suggest several motivations driving negative reciprocity. On the one hand, 
our positive finding of prosociality predicting negative reciprocity supports the theory that 
prosocial participants follow strong reciprocity by sacrificing their own resources in order to 
punish unfair behavior (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). 
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On the other hand, our finding that also assertiveness has a significant influence on negative 
reciprocity suggests that emotional styles or personality traits lead people to punish unfair 
behavior, allowing them to preserve integrity and avoid the imposition of an inferior status 
(Yamagishi et al., 2012). 
In ERPs we did not find a significant difference in the neural response elicited by the 
face of unfair and fair proposers, but between both unfair and fair as compared with neutral 
proposers. This suggests differential neural mechanisms being involved in the processing of 
faces associated with different fairness conditions as compared with provided offers in our 
study. The FN found here in response to a proposer’s face seems to be an emotion signal 
coding a general social arousal effect which might be similar to the processing of emotional 
context information in faces (Abdel Rahman, 2011; Wieser & Brosch, 2012). Our brain-
behavior analysis with mSEM suggests that this social arousal effect is particularly evolved in 
strong reciprocators corroborating the results by Boksem and De Cremer (2009) where people 
with higher fairness concerns in terms of moral identity showed a more pronounced relative 
FN in response to offers in the UG. In our study this effect was transferred to the face of the 
proposer, suggesting that the FN is truly a social signal reflecting social evaluation and 






3 General discussion and future directions 
The present dissertation researched the neurobiological basis of individual differences 
in interpersonal abilities and traits and their relations with social decisions. Study 1 extended 
existing evidence on brain-behavior relationships (Herzmann et al., 2010) between 
psychometric constructs of face cognition and ERP components associated with different 
stages of face processing (encoding, perception, and memory). Our findings confirm a 
substantial relationship between the N170 latency and the ERE amplitude with all three face 
cognition abilities. The shorter the N170 latency and the more pronounced the ERE 
amplitude, the better is the performance in face perception and memory and the faster is the 
speed of face cognition. Study 2 found that the ability to recognize fearful faces as well as the 
general spontaneous expressiveness during social interaction are linked to prosocial choices in 
several socio-economic games. Sensitivity to the distress of others as well as spontaneous 
expressiveness seem to foster reciprocal interactions with prosocial others. Study 3 confirmed 
the model of strong reciprocity in that prosociality drives negative reciprocity in the 
ultimatum game. Using multilevel SEM in order to model brain-behavior relationships of 
fairness preferences, we found strong reciprocators to show more pronounced relative FN 
amplitude in response to the faces of bargaining partners. 
In the following I will first discuss the measurement of associations between 
interpersonal traits and physiological variables (section 3.1). In this section I will focus on 
methodological challenges when estimating brain-behavior relationships of social cognition 
which made us apply performance measures of interpersonal abilities in SEM instead of 
correlating self-report scales with physiological data on a manifest level. Thereafter, I will 
comment on the use of socio-economic games to quantify individual differences in social 
interaction (section 3.2) before I turn to a broader discussion about the use of brain-behavior 
relationships in order to study a representative brain in modern “population neuroscience” 
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(section 3.3). Unresolved questions and suggestions for future research are discussed along 
the way. 
3.1 Brain-behavior relationships of interpersonal abilities 
Differential psychology encompasses the psychometric assessment of abilities and 
personality with special emphasis given to their real-world significance, their developmental 
antecedents and their social consequences (Lubinski, 2000). With the advancement of 
neuroscientific tools such as EEG and fMRI more research was devoted to the investigation of 
the biological basis of individual differences in cognition, such as in intelligence research 
(Hendrickson & Hendrickson, 1980; Jensen, 1998), but later also in affective and social 
processes. The first studies (Sternberg, 1997; Tomarken, Davidson, Wheeler, & Doss, 1992) 
in this latter domain were based on psychophysiological personality theories such as 
Eysenck’s theory asserting that low cortical arousal accompanies extraversion (Eysenck, 
1967), and Gray’s reinforcement sensitivity theory (for a discussion of the translation of 
Gray's theory in the animal model to the study of individual differences in humans see 
Markett, Montag, & Reuter, 2014). Gray’s theory claims that impulsivity is associated with 
high sensitivity to signals of reward, whereas anxiety is accompanied with high sensitivity to 
signals of punishment (Gray, 1982, 1987). Also, the theory by Davidson (1992), that 
individual differences in approach- and avoidance-related emotional reactivity and 
temperament are linked to stable differences in baseline measures of activation asymmetry in 
anterior regions, forwarded research on brain-behavior relationships of interpersonally 
relevant traits.  
The advance of social neuroscience using fMRI increased the number of studies 
reporting correlations between measures of individual differences relating to emotion, 
personality, and social cognition and measures of neural activity. For instance, Singer, 





left insula induced by an empathy-related manipulation to be correlated between .52 and .72 
with self-report measures of emotional empathy (Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale of 
Mehrabian and Empathic Concern Scale of Davis). Studies like this drew a lot of attention in 
the young field of Neuroeconomics, but they were soon to face scrutinizing reception by the 
scientific peer community: In an article in Perspectives on Psychological Science Vul, Harris, 
Winkielman, and Pashler (2009) reviewed social neuroscience studies using fMRI and 
pointed to unusually high (>.8) correlations between brain activation and personality 
measures. While their argument regarding the inflated brain-behavior correlations due to non-
independent analyses (“double dipping”) was disputed by scientists whose studies were 
reviewed (Lieberman, Berkman, & Wager, 2009), Vul et al. (2009) also claimed that the 
considered brain-behavior correlations are higher than should be expected given the limited 
reliability of both fMRI and self-report personality measures. Since the correlation coefficient 
is calculated as the ratio between the covariance of two measures and the product of their 
standard deviations, the reliabilities of the two measures provide an upper bound on the 
possible size of the correlation (Nunnally, 1970).  
In the studies of the present dissertation we suggest an alternative approach to the 
investigation of brain-behavior relationships in the interpersonal domain which offers a more 
reliable, and importantly, more valid account of individual differences in brain-behavior 
relationships of social cognition. In study 1 and 2 we applied performance-based instead of 
self-reported measures of interpersonal abilities because only these adequately conceptualize 
ability constructs (Wilhelm, 2005) and are less likely to be distorted by response biases 
(Kämpfe et al., 2009; Kluemper, 2008). Moreover, we were not calculating a manifest 
correlation between one measure for individual differences in an interpersonal trait (such as a 
self-report empathy scale) and one neuronal parameter (such as relative physiological 
activation in a specific region). By employing SEM and LDS we rather established brain–
behavior relationships on a latent, and therefore measurement-error-free level. Using several 
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indicators per latent interpersonal ability factors we were therefore able to estimate individual 
differences in interpersonal abilities in a more reliable and valid manner. 
However, both in studies 1 and 3 problems arose when modelling brain-behavior 
relationships of rather late ERPs in the form of difference waves such as the ERE, LRE and 
FN. While the brain-behavior relationships of earlier components – as the association between 
N170 latency with accuracy of face perception, face memory and speed of face cognition 
(Herzmann et al., 2010; Kaltwasser, Hildebrandt, Recio, Wilhelm, & Sommer, 2014) – 
showed stability across studies, the brain-behavior relationships of the later difference 
components were more difficult to model. The reason for this challenge was that they often 
showed limited inter-individual variance, so that modeling their relation to individual 
differences in behavioral measures was not always possible. Even when we established the 
difference scores on a latent level with LDS in order to circumvent unreliable manifest 
difference scores (Nesselroade et al., 1980), the latent difference did not show a significant 
variance across persons in some cases. In study 3 we therefore applied multilevel SEM with 
single trial data in order to model brain-behavior relationships of FN amplitude differences 
between experimental conditions (including neutral, fair and unfair proposer) with individual 
differences in fairness preferences. The first level tested the within-person experimental 
manipulation effects of the proposer’s fairness (unfair, neutral, fair) on eliciting the FN. The 
second level included between-person variations in the latent factors of fairness preferences 
and personality (negative reciprocity, prosociality, assertiveness, honesty-humility). Here, we 
examined whether the fairness condition effect in FN amplitude elicited by the face of the 
proposer was larger in participants with higher scores in negative reciprocity, prosociality, 
assertiveness or honesty-humility. Commonly used in educational and developmental areas, 
multilevel models can also be useful for experimental designs with repeated measurements 





Another reason for the limited variability of later difference components in the range 
of the P300 (such as ERE, LRE and FN) is the overlap of adjacent components and the 
smearing of time-variable components, broadening their shape and diminishing their 
amplitude. In order to overcome this problem, future work might combine LDS with residue 
iteration decomposition (RIDE), a new method that allows researchers to separate ERP 
components on the basis of latency variability in single trials (Ouyang, Herzmann, Zhou, & 
Sommer, 2011). The component clusters extracted by RIDE might show greater between-
condition variance, since they can be corrected for latency variability. 
3.2 The use of socio-economic games to study individual differences 
Humans differ in the pursuit of their own material self-interest and the value they 
assign to social goals (Burlando & Guala, 2005; Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011). The socio-
economic games studied in this dissertation exposed inter-individual variance in fairness 
preferences underlying the conflict between selfish and prosocial tendencies. Using multiple 
one-shot socio-economic games such as the PD and SVO, study 2 found active cooperation in 
terms of increasing the joint outcome to be associated with ability to recognize fearful face 
expressions and the tendency to be more emotionally expressive. As discussed in section 2.2 
we interpreted these findings in line with existing research in that prosocial individuals are 
more sensitive to the distress of others (Marsh et al., 2007) and more expressive, possibly 
fostering reciprocal interactions with like-minded others (Schug et al., 2010). Study 3 on the 
other hand resulted in prosocial individuals showing stronger negative reciprocity quantified 
by higher rejection rates of unfair offers in UG. Moreover, negative reciprocity predicted 
individual differences in the FN, a neural indicator of social evaluation. These findings 
suggest that fairness consideration affects early stages of social evaluation. Altogether the 
results of study 2 and 3 reveal a heterogeneity of behavior in socio-economic games that is 
indicative for individual differences in basic affective and cognitive processes. As Zhao and 
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Smillie (2015) point out, this inter-individual variation can also be partially explained by 
personality constructs such as dispositional sensitivities to gain and loss (Corr & 
McNaughton, 2012) and tendencies towards social dominance and affiliation such as 
assertiveness (Yamagishi et al., 2012), and honesty-humility (Ashton & Lee, 2008). 
Socio-economic games are well-controlled and replicable behavioral paradigms, 
bridging the gap between economic game theory and naturalistic data. They offer a reliable 
and valid alternative to self-report measures when studying broad and fuzzy personality 
constructs such as prosociality or trustworthiness (Camerer & Fehr, 2004). Importantly, their 
simple experimental design allows for statistically powerful manipulations. Experimental 
manipulations can be carried out by changes in relative pay-offs and by the introduction of 
additional (economic) variables such as certainty of pay-offs (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Sally, 
1995). In Psychology, a greater interest lies on effects of psychological states such as for 
example mood (Harle & Sanfey, 2007, 2010) or social signals (Mussel, Hewig, Allen, Coles, 
& Miltner, 2014) on cooperation behavior. The games are described in an objective manner 
with abstract language and pay-off examples to depict strategies rather than concrete 
descriptions like “helping” or “trusting”. Abstract language is used to prevent framing effects 
or violations of the principle of description invariance (Camerer & Fehr, 2004). Small 
changes in the experimental procedures, especially in terms of social cues, can trigger large 
changes in results. For example, Andreoni and Rao (2011) experimentally manipulated, which 
player in a dyadic DG could speak and found that whenever the recipient spoke, giving 
behavior increased. Furthermore, Haley and Fessler (2005) discovered that people act more 
cooperatively when a pair of eyes is shown at the location of the computer screen where a 
bargaining partner makes an allocation. Lastly, also the group size of participants in a given 
game affects cooperation behavior. If the average impact on another individual declines (as 





(Stahl & Haruvy, 2006). These findings question the external validity of measurements of 
cooperation behavior in neutrally framed laboratory games (Levitt & List, 2007). 
However, when studying individual differences in socio-economic choices, the 
paradigms allow investigating whether or not experimental manipulations affect the 
correlational structure of the dispositional variables. In line with the outlined interactionistic 
account of biopsychological personality research (see section 1.1, Stemmler & Wacker, 
2010), the situational context and its subjective representation by the participants should 
moderate the trait–physiology relationships. In study 2 the feedback about the co-player’s 
decision to cooperate or defect in PD moderated the relationship between prosociality and 
spontaneous emotion expression in that prosocial participants expressed more positive 
emotion after learning about cooperation, but more negative emotion after being confronted 
with defection. In study 3 the fairness of the proposer in UG moderated the relationship 
between negative reciprocity and relative FN, in that participants with high negative 
reciprocity had a more pronounced relative FN. Future research should try to further 
disentangle the differential effects of state and trait variables onto socio-economic choices. 
For instance Riepl, Mussel, Osinsky, and Hewig (2016) investigated the influences of state 
affect (temporal emotions induced by a short video clip) and trait affect (longer-lasting 
emotional dispositions) onto responder behavior and ERPs in UG. High trait negative affect 
led to more pronounced FN amplitudes when participants were in an angry mood, but not if 
they currently experienced fear or happiness. Their findings suggest that the relationship 
between trait variables and behavior or neuronal correlates in socio-economic games is 
dependent on situational context. Future research should therefore incorporate strong 
experimental manipulation within socio-economic games in order to increase shared variance 
between interpersonal traits and cooperation behavior also in laboratory settings. 
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3.3 The representative brain 
A recent project conducting replications of 100 psychology studies reported low 
reliability and reproducibility of studies in psychology (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), a 
problem that has also recently been discussed in neuroscience (Button et al., 2013; Ioannidis, 
2005). Using high power designs with the original material, the Open Science Collaboration 
found the mean effect size of the replication to be half the size of the mean effect size of the 
original psychology article. The project revealed especially low percentages of replications in 
social psychology due to weaker original effects in this domain. The authors concluded that 
variation in the strength of the original evidence (such as original p value) better predicted 
replication success than the variation in the characteristics of the researchers conducting the 
research (such as expertise and experience). While publication and reporting biases are found 
to be partly responsible for low reproducibility since publications emphasize and reward 
positive findings, another reason for the inflated effect sizes are small sample sizes since they 
lead to low statistical power of a study. The statistical power of an experiment is the 
probability that the null hypothesis will be correctly rejected when it is false (Cohen, 1992). 
Statistical power is dependent on the significance criterion (such as α < .05), the sample size 
(N), and the effect size in the population (ES). The lower the power of a study, the lower the 
probability that a discovered effect that passes the required threshold of declaring its 
observation (that is a criterion such as α < .05) actually reflects a true effect (Ioannidis, 2005). 
Even when a study with low power detects a true effect, it is likely that the estimate of the 
effect size reported by that study will be exaggerated. Therefore, Button et al. (2013) claim 
that small sample sizes undermine the reliability of neuroscience. They report the average 
statistical power of neuroscience studies to be very low which leads to an overestimation of 
effect size and low reproducibility of results. Importantly, not only small sample size poses a 
problem but also unrepresentative samples, undermining findings regarding brain–behavior 





population neuroscience in order to shed light on a representative brain by providing 
generalizability of findings with large sample sizes. They suggest increasing the 
representativeness of samples using neuroimaging approaches in order to account for the 
inter- and intra-individual variance in neuroscientific data. While experimental psychology or 
neuroscience often study changes in means due to treatments, the inter- and intra-individual 
variability among organisms observed by a differential perspective bears fundamental 
principles of life which ought to be part of modern life science. Hence, E. B. Falk et al. (2013) 
promote different areas of emphasis within a population neuroscience framework: First they 
suggest collecting larger samples at multiple time points (by merging existing data sets and 
meta-analyses) in order to increase replicability and generalizability of results. Second, they 
propose emphasizing a larger social context and experience as a predictor and moderator of 
brain-behavior links, such as hyperscanning, whereby the neural activity of two participants 
interacting is recorded simultaneously, in order to augment ecological validity. Third they 
advocate collaborations between neural and social scientists. Their rationale being that 
neuroscience can gain from increased focus on samples and on contextual effects, while 
population science can gain from increased understanding of brain as mediator of context-
behavior links.  
The introduction of this dissertation outlined a collaboration between philosophical 
stances and psychometric models which offers an empirically testable and sound 
mathematical foundation for the reduction problem. The neuroscientific studies included into 
this dissertation provide an important step in the right direction for the investigation of brain-
behavior relationships in contemporary life science. We applied multivariate modelling with 
sufficiently large samples in order to investigate individual differences in socio-emotional 
functions using paradigms borrowed from behavioral economics. Additionally, we collected 
genetic data which was not the scope of the dissertation but can help us to understand the 
influence of nature versus nurture in the established brain-behavior relationships. Future 
33 
 
Interpersonal abilities & social decisions 
 
projects should clarify to which extent the associations between interpersonal traits and EPRs 
are based on genetic and environmental influences. The discussion about studying individual 
differences in socio-economic games (section 3.2) emphasized the importance of broader 
context and culture. Ignoring variables such as linguistic framing and cultural norms (see also 
the discussion of study 3 in the attached manuscript) leads to the assumption of uniform 
brain-behavior relationships which are unlikely. While behavioral economists have a long 
time considered anonymous laboratory settings to be the gold standard for studying socio-
economic decisions, modern Neuroeconomics placed emphasis on the influence of 
psychological context and culture on cooperation behavior. Interestingly, this change in 
methodology brought along a change in perception in that the homo oeconomicus has been 
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